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> SUPREME COURT NO. 870346 
BRIEF OF THIRD - PA RT Y DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS SEVERIN 
JURISJ^ ICTJJ)N 
This Court granted Appellant Woodard's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, appealing the Utah Court of Appeals' decision affirming 
a Third District Court decision. In the Third Judicial District 
Court, Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding, judgment was 
granted in favor of Appellant against Respondent Jensen for damages. 
Judgment was also granted in favor of Respondent Severin against 
Appellant Woodard quieting title to certain property in Summit 
County. 
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ISSUE 
The issue presented for review is: Who has superior title to 
the subject property—Woodard or Severin? 
STATJ^ MENT_ OF_TJ^ E_CA_SE 
This is a quiet title action. To overcome Severin1s superior 
titlef Woodard is asking the Court to reform a 1972 Option 
Agreement on real property and then grant specific performance 
thereon. The facts of the case are as follows: 
1. In 1972, Woodard met with a developer, W. Brent Jensen, to 
discuss the purchase by Woodard of five acres of mountain property 
in Summit County, owned by Jensen, as a cabin site. They agreed on 
a parcel and marked a corner with a pile of rocks. (R. 288.) 
2. On September 21, 1972, Woodard and Jensen executed a 
written agreement, agreeing to give Woodard an option to the 
property, subject to a plat being recorded with Summit County 
allowing for subdivision into five acre lots. (Exhibit 19-P.) The 
Agreement is included herein as Ex. A of the Appendix. 
3. The agreement contained an erroneous legal description: 
It used as its beginning point the southwest corner of Section 28, 
rather than the west quarter corner. (Exhibit 19-P, R. 268, 270-72, 
423, 476-77.) 
4. In August of 1973, before Jensen had recorded the 
property in conformance with the Agreement, Woodard commenced 
construction of a cabin on the "intended" property. (R. 293.) 
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5. Summit County would not approve the Jensen plat for five 
acre lots because there was not a central water system within 
several thousand feet of the property. (R. 374, 367-67, 377-78, 
400-01.) 
6. Jensen explained to Woodard that he would not be able to 
sell the property as a five acre lot as recited in the agreement. 
(R. 379f 415-16.) 
7. Woodard*s response was to record with Summit County the 
1972 Agreement—which described property one-half mile south of the 
"intended" property—and file this lawsuit against Jensen seeking 
specific performance. (R. 289, 449, Exhibit 19-P.) 
8. Woodard stopped work on his cabin in 1975. It was not 
completed and has not been worked on since 1975. (R.306-07.) 
9. On August 20, 1973f Severin purchased from Jensen prop-
erty adjacent to the "intended" Woodard property. (Exhibit 1-D.) 
10. Severin commenced construction of a summer home in 
August, 1973, on the property conveyed to him by Jensen, and 
finished it the same year, with an addition added in 1981. (R. 441, 
446.) 
11. Various deeds in 1974, 1976 and 1977 from Security Title, 
acting as trustee for Brent Jensen, conveyed additional adjacent 
property to Severin, including the "intended" Woodard property. 
(Exhibits 2-D, 3-D, 4-D, 5-D, 6-D.) 
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12. Severin was added as a third party defendant in 1979. 
(R.69.) 
13. In October of 1980f Woodard filed a Third Amended 
Complaint alleging for the first time mutual mistake in the legal 
description in the 1972 Option Agreement, and offering for the 
first time a substituted legal description of the property, which 
is at considerable variance to the description written in the 1972 
Agreement, even allowing for the mistake. (R.107-111.) The two 
descriptions are drawn below: 
\ 
A. Intended Description 
B. Description in 3rd 
Amended Complaint 
14. Because of the numerous legal descriptions involved, a 
large chart with overlays was submitted to the Court as Exhibit 
18-D, but has not been transmitted to the Supreme Court because of 
its size. For the sake of clarity, counsel has attempted to 
reconstruct Exhibit 18-D on the following page showing the various 
legal descriptions. 
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N.W. L/4, SECTION' 28 
T.l N. R.4 E. S.L.B.§ M. 
N 
N 
\ 
\ 
V 
Deed No. 4 
-*£!. 
^ . 
^ Best. S 
Woodard ca&j.n 
H -V 
Deed 
\^ Dest. B ^ ^ 
L Severin 
cabin 
Deed No. 1 
IVest 1/4 corner Section 28 
No. 3 
Deed Nd. 2 
\ 
Explanation 
Description A 
Description B 
Description C 
Deed No. 1 
Deed No. 2 
Deed No. 3 
Deed No. 4 
Deed No. 5 
1972 Agreement 
Intended Location 
3rd Amended Complaint 
Severin 8/20/73 
(Exhibit 1-D) 
Severin 11/22/74 
(Exhibit 2-D) 
Severin 7/30/76 
(Exhibit 5-D) 
Severin 12/27/77 
(Exhibit 35-D) 
Sale by Severin to 
3rd parties 11/23/77 
(Exhibit 6-D) 
SUJI^RY^JDF^^RGUME^NT 
In a quiet title action, one must prevail on the merits of 
his own title, and Severin has a superior title to Woodard. 
Even allowing Woodard to reform the legal description in his 
Agreement of 1972, does not change the fact that the Agreement is 
an agreement to give an option subject to a condition subsequent; 
the condition subsequent never occurred; and title to the land 
never passed to Woodard. 
^GUMENT 
I 
REFORMING THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT GIVE 
WOODARD SUPERIOR TITLE TO SEVERIN 
The essence of Woodard's brief is that he asks for reformation 
of the Agreement to correct the legal description, on the basis of 
mutual mistake, and then is asking for specific performance of that 
Agreement. 
There is no dispute, and never has been, that the legal 
description contained in the 1972 Agreement between Jensen and 
Woodard is erroneous. The error was that description was tied to 
the southwest corner, rather than the west quarter corner of 
section 28. It describes property one-half mile to the south of 
the property contemplated by Jensen and Woodard. (R. 268, 270-272, 
423, 476-77.) 
But once the legal description is corrected, what does Woodard 
have? 
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The Agreement states in pertinent part: 
This agreement made and entered into this 21st day of 
September, 1972, by and between W. BRENT JENSEN, 
hereinafter referred to as Seller and CECIL WOODARD, 
hereinafter referred to as buyer. Now, therefore, it is 
hereby agreed between the parties as follows: 
1. It is agreed that the seller is desirous of selling 
and the buyer is desirous of buying a parcel of ground 
more specifically described as 
(A metes and bounds legal description is written 
in by hand.) 
The seller also agrees that this parcel of land will be a 
minimum of 5 acres. 
2. It is understood that Lot 1 is in the process of 
being made ready for recording with Summit County, Utah 
and cannot be sold at this time. However, seller agrees 
that when Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer has first right 
and option to purchase Lot No. 1. 
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy part of Forest 
Meadow Ranch Plat C Lot #69, more specifically desribed 
as 
(Legal description typed in.) 
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. At the time Lot 
No. 1 is recorded the buyer will release the right and 
interest in Lot No. 2, and will exercise his option on 
Lot No. 1. 
* * * 
7. The Seller hereby agrees to furnish to buyer Title 
Insurance to the property no later than October 1, 1974. 
* * * 
(Emphasis added.) 
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(1) 
AGREEMENT IS NOT A "LAND PURCHASE AGREEMENT." 
First of allf the Agreement is not a "land purchase 
agreements as appellant is so wont to call it. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. lf 1[#2f and entire Argument on pages 6-9.) Correcting the legal 
description does not "reform" the above Agreement into a conveyance 
of title. 
Appellant's brief cites a plethora of cases for the prop-
osition that specific performance of a contract to sell land is a 
well recognized remedy in equity. (Brief pp. 6-9.) All parties to 
this lawsuit recognize that principle of law as being sound. 
The difference in this case is that appellant does not have a 
land sale contract. Paragraph No. 2 of the Agreement is all 
important. It states: 
2. It is understood that Lot 1 is in the process of 
being made ready for recording with Summit County, Utah 
and cannot be sold at this time. However, seller agrees 
that when Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer has first right 
and option to purchase Lot No. 1. 
Appellant has even acknowledged that the 1972 Agreement does 
not convey title. In Answers to Request for Admissions appellant 
stated: 
REQUEST NO. 2: Do you admit that no written document 
was ever drafted conveying title to you of the property 
described in your Third Amended Complaint, paragraph 8? 
ANSWER: Yes. (R. 190.) 
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Appellant is asking this Court to reform the 1 972 Agreement 
based upon t h e m i s t a k e i n t h e J e g a 1 d e s c r i p t i o n, I: • i I t ;i : e f : • r e 
1 e g a J d e s c r i p t i o :i: :t d c e s i I c t 11 ::t r i: i t h e I \ g r e e m e n t i n t c a c o n v e y a :u tr of 
tit] e, The Agreement was never inte-ned to ronvey title and 
Woodard acknowledges that THIHI) HI oy M M e . 
i ' » I 
LOT 1 COULD NOT BE RECORDED AS A FIVE ACRE PARCEL 
T h e A g r e e m e n t r;\,»eci f i ca ] ] j states 11: Iat llSe-I ] er agrees 11: iat 
when 1,.0'L No I is recorded the Buyer has first right and sption to 
r>u ;hase L< Defendant Jensen testify 1 '^ v lal 
that 
County would nut allow the recording of five acre subdivision "ots 
when a centra,! water systern was not available to the proper ty. 
.1 ! " !•! , i "I I , 1 1 1 I » • • 
R e c o r d i n g o t t h e pi oper t.\ a s a f i v e aci :e 1 o t w i t h i n a su11• • 
d i v i s i o n war. a c o n d i t i o ! - m e Agrerrnpnt , riv" . 'or I n I-HI inv i ' i 
ocvu i i: hMl i n J diii a l e s u i t . J e n s e n c o u l d i'ii-t,r Uf i e n n s of t: Li-, L972 
Ag r e eme n t , q i v e Woodard a " f i i: s t r igh t a 11d opt: i on " t, o 1 iOt No . I . 
Absent t h e recordii ' iq Willi .'liiiiniiil i'l'iunl,1, |PM:'I, I I, k , ,-,p^ M.: J L H 
pei: I; onmance of I. he Agr e e m e n t . BLT^^Inv^.^^Co^^j^^^Sjic^w, 586 P. 2d 
456 (1978). As the Court of Appeals in this matter said: 
Recording was clearly a condition precedent to Jensen's duty 
to offer a first right and option to purchase the property 
under the Agreement. As the condition precedent of the Agree-
ment has not been fulfilledf the equitable remedies of 
reformation and specific performance of the Agreement are not 
available to Woodard. (62 U.Adv.Rpt. 29) 
(3) 
THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION SUED UPON DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF THE 1972 AGREEMENT 
Even reforming the legal description contained in the 1972 
Agreementf to tie the description to the west quarter corner, 
rather than the southwest corner, does not account for the fact 
that appellant has sued for property having a legal description 
which has no similarity to the description contained in the 1972 
Agreement. 
The legal description in the 1972 Agreement is: 
Beginning at a point North, 680 ft. and East, 520 ft. from 
the S*W. corner sec. 28, TIN, R4E, SLB&M and running thence 
N 61°30' E, 670 ft.; N 30 00 • W, 330 ft.; S. 61 20'W, 
665 ft.; S 76 30 ' W, 130 ft. to the point of beginning. 
The description in paragraph 8 of plaintiff's Third Amended 
Complaint is: 
Beginning at a point which is North 0 S'll" West 1268.458 
feet and East 634.54 feet from the West quarter corner of 
Section 28, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence North 87°3f56" East 733.74 feet; 
thence South 4°12llfl West 318.98 feet; thence South 
85°10fl" West 600.00 feet; thence North 18°27f12" West 
349.40 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 5.0 
acres. 
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!"n answers to Interrogatories appellant was asked why there 
J isc i e par icy i n I h ," I * .J.I I 
Agreement and the Third Amendec C o m p . a i : • -- . :jar.or.- and 
Answers are as f:o11ows": 
I N T E R R O G A T O R Y NO. 1: On what basis are you claiming an 
interest in the property described in your Third Amended 
Complant, pa ragraph 8 ? 
ANSWER: Agreement betweei I W • Brent J ensen and 
plaintiff dated September 21, 1972. Performance of said 
Agreement and designation on the ground by the seller of 
the land to be described in the Agreement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Who made the survey describing 
the property in your Third Amended Complaint, paragraph 8? 
ANSWER: Apposian Consulting Engineers, Inc. 
E survey completed? 
ANSWER: About loui y<":: • (Answered Janudiv . ;~.) 
* rpquestf ; . , _;vey be made? 
ANSWER: Plaintiff. 
INTERROGATORY NO , 4: Whj are you ci aiming interest in 
the property described in your Third Amended Complaint 
instead of the property described in your Agreement with 
Brent Jensen dated September 21r 1972? 
ANSWER: The property described in the Third Amended 
Complaint was intended by both parties to be covered by 
the Agreement dated December (si c) 21, 197 2, The property 
described in the Agreement was incorrectly described and 
covers land some distance away. (R. 193-194.) 
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Appellant's lawsuit is asking for property which was not 
intended by the parties. (R. 367-68.) The property intended by 
the parties is identified in the 1972 Agreement, but should be ti 
to the west quarter corner, rather than the southwest corner of 
Section 28. Appellant should not be allowed to arbitrarily 
determine any five acres he so choosesf and certainly this five 
acres was not contemplated in the 1972 Agreement. (R. 367-68.) 
(4) 
APPELLANT ACKNOWLEDGES HE NEVER RECEIVED TITLE 
At trial, Woodard testified he never received title to the 
property: 
Q. You were describing to us your cabin in the latter 
part of your testimony. Now, it's true, is it not, your 
cabin has been built in stages? Isn't that so? 
A. Well, I did not complete it totally, and the reason 
I did not, I had not secured title. (R.315.) 
* * * 
Q. Why did you build the cabin in 1973 on property 
that you didn't have title to? 
A. Well, I had an Agreement I was going to get title 
to it. 
Q. But you admit you did not have title to it at the 
time you commenced construction? 
A. Oh, I knew that. I knew I didn't have title. 
Q. When did you obtain title? 
-13-
A „ I have not obtained title yet. That's why we 1re 
here. (R 3 28,) 
(Emphasis added.) 
D) 
APPELLANT'S REMEDY IS DAMAGES 
Specific performance connotes "performance specifica ] ly as 
a q i e e d . " I! 1111 e nt 1: Ia s i i• :: j: i: o v i s :i :: • i I t • :: spe < . 
convey titler there can be no specific performance,' as prayed - o-
h'V Appel J ant her ei n Appel lant1 s remedy then, is for damages. 
Appei I .',n;il J i Cumplduil makes a eJ ai m for damages "' d.-,. un all M MH I, i ver 
if,, fin any reason, a decree cannot be ei itered as prayed "  ' The 
Tr j_a2 c o u r t awarded appe] ] ant damages. 
II. 
TITjjji SHOULD BE QUIETED TO SEVERIN 
BASED UPON THE STRENGTH OF SEVERIN 1S TITLE. 
* e 
cannc . . t . . i weakness . :.* i . e : ^ : , . . -
rrength >r • i ~9.L®IE§D v •. _EJut^l^oyJL<2h, S ; w F * — a t 
'i^rj_ Xj*__?ta_te, " ' . : . . i * ' : ;^"! <\sn n >..• s t a t e d : 
An action to qui et title is an action at law where the 
pleadings put in issue the ownership and possession of 
real property. In such an action, the plaintiff must 
succeed by virtue of the strength of his own title rathei: 
than the weakness of defendant's ti11e; neverthe1ess a11 
the plaintiff need do is to prove prima facie that he has 
titlef which if not overcome by defendant, is sufficient. 
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Since this is an action at law, upon reviewf the findings 
and judgment of the trial court will be presumed valid, 
and the record will be reviewed in a light favorable to 
them. The appellant is required to sustain the burden of 
proving error, and the judgment of the trial court will 
not be disturbed if there be substantial evidence in the 
record to support it. (At 1376.) 
And to prove prima facie title this Court, in ^sic^^Servj^e 
Corpc>raW^n_y^JWalt(yif 20 Utah 2d 16, 434 P. 2d 334 (1967) 
reaffirmed the language in Cottj^elJ^j^ 32 Utah 62, 88 P. 
696 (1907) , which indicates what a party must do in quiet title 
actions to prove title: 
* * * Of course, where one proves a perfect chain of paper 
title from its original source, no proof of actual 
possession at all is required. In such event the 
presumption would be all sufficient and the title would be 
a complete and perfect title. But, when this is not done, 
a title prima facie is shown by a grant from some one who 
held possession, or by such grant and possession under it 
by the grantee. As against a mere technical objection by 
anyone who, at the time the objection is made, appears to 
be a mere stranger to the title, such a prima facie title 
would seem quite sufficient. To require more against such 
an objector would require every one to prove a perfect 
chain of title as against every stranger making any kind 
of claim. This the law does not require. If the objector 
has a better or stronger title than the prima facie title 
proved, then he must show it, and until he does the prima 
facie title prevails. (At 20.) 
Severin did not produce an abstract of title at trial covering 
the disputed property, but did show a prima facie title by 
introducing into evidence a Special Warranty Deed dated July 30, 
1976, in which Security Title Company, as trustee for Jensen, 
conveyed to Dick I. Severin and Donna Severin, 56.01 acres, which 
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deed was recorded - CII ^ of * ,e Summit County Recorder 
i 
That jeuu.. ..,*c *i- . possession - , ; o|~.* 
title - *•: *. Severn^ wu_ Le_t-i±ed -~ ~^  h*.. i^~ ^ x w i ~o 
w^ -*1-
 A
r yc*r por-;M — it Se:r.t:'\ ""I1:*-? 
rieSiUt;..w **. charge oi cs^^^w ^iwoeauitro, 
closi i- . 
». . * ^ tiiiJ
 ] Vu a document * * , ,J- -; * ee. 
admitted into evidence previously and *- Exn i r . t ~ . *i i :n 
is a special warranty deed from Security Title to Richard 
I. Sever in and Donna Severin. I hand you that document 
and ask you if you are familiar with i t? 
A. I am familiar with the form, but not specifically 
this deed. We held title as trustee to this particular 
tract of ground. It was signed by Craig Thompson, who is 
still with our company. Well, in fact, he's manager of 
the office now. Lucille Wright, who was secretary of * 
corporation at the time. Conveys from us, Security Tit. 
Trust Company to Richard I. Sever in. Donna Severin. 
Q. Has Security Title ever prepared a policy of title 
insurance or a title search on this property? 
A. From looking at this deed, I would say it appears 
that it has because the number on the top looks like 
12051-2 is an identification number for our office in 
Heber City. 
Q. I hand you an exhibit marked 8-D and ask you if 
you. can, identi fy that document. 
A. This is a policy of title insurance that was 
issued by our office in Heber City. It has been signed by 
a Darwin McGuire, who is the manager of the office in 
Heber City, and i t bears the same identification number as 
this deed has on i t. 
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Q. Does it bear the same legal description as the 
deed. 
A. Yes. I looked at this a few moments ago and it 
does have the same legal description as the special 
warranty deed. (R. 432-434.) (Emphasis added.) 
Exhibit 8-D is a policy of title insurance, dated August 5f 
1976, and states that "The estate or interest referred to herein is 
at Date of Policy vested in: RICHARD I. SEVERIN and DONNA 
SEVERIN, his wife, as joint tenants." 
Exhibit 35-D was also introduced into evidence, being a 
Special Warranty Deed from Security Title Company to Richard I. 
Severin and Donna Severin, dated December 27, 1977, and recorded in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder on December 30, 1977 at 
Book M 107, Page 28, Entry No. 14301 (Deed No. 4, Chart A). 
No evidence was introduced at trial, no question ever raised, 
and no allegations by W. Brent Jensen or Appellant that Security 
Title Company did not have possession, nor that they could not 
convey title to said properties to Severin. 
All the plaintiff need do was to prove prima facie that he had 
a title which, if not overcome by defendant, would be sufficient. 
See B^bccK^k^y^^Dan^rfieJLd, supra. Severin1 s prima facie title was 
put into evidence, and to overcome it, Woodard needed to show a 
better or stronger title. He did not do it. 
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III. 
RESPONSE TO WOODARD BRIEF 
111" 11 e ti s e 111; t •»I I 11 *' W <; i M 1,11 c1 b r i, e 1 i n t J i a t;„ L h e 1. {J * 2 Op t i o r 
Agreement should be reformed because of a mutual mistake 3?. * rre 
legal description of the land-- and ir , HIP In1 M H I h.at 
yal (iescr ipt ion contained an error, The appellant • a<- i3Ken 
t:. - po s i t i o n t h at re f o r: m a 11 o n 1) f t h e J. e g a J d e s c r i p t 1 o n reforms the 
Areement into a "lain! purrhru.p aqrepiiiont " .in i ••'1 t a \ a : 
support of lhe proposition thai land purchase agreements can be 
specifically performed. That is tru^, 111st not applicable. 
I III I III I I I 1 I I I I i l l I 1 1 II i l l I II I 1 ' III II 1 I 1 » II ( 1 1 I M t i L H I I I I ) . • . ; c ; « - J 
raises some issues which are equally not applicable, but 
respondent would like to hilefly respond. 
Ai " H ! ' \ I Ml J T f 1 I ' n|ir I I a m i ' 
Sever i ris hahl irtual notice ot Woodar;"a agreement jjurcr.as* ' 
(Brief, p. 1 i > Had Woodard haa • agreement, L U £ 
pi "['H » , , 1 ,i I T il it- In iiuik w*i^, argument an« ...u.w. *~ 
believable, Hut he never had an agreement +:o purchase. He has not 
been able to convince t-ithrr I In fii.il appcala I'mnl , I lim 
lie lurid a land purchase agreement, su il .»eeins a Iittie speeiuti;. to 
argue that Se^erin had notice ol it. 
The statu! 1 n t ma I mil i M I > ::'arl iinii ri7-'l h Utah Cude 
^ji£ta_te_d, winch provtciesi 
• Every conveyance ot real estate, and every instrument of 
writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real 
estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or 
1 8 -
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by 
this title and recorded in the office of the recorder of 
the county in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto 
without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or 
record, and as to all other persons who have had actual 
notice. (Emphasis added.) 
The early case of Toljmd_y_._J2orej£, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190, 
cited in appellant's brief, (p. 16, 17) fairly states the case law 
regarding the above statute: 
Our statute requires actual notice and constructive 
notice is not sufficient. The demands of the statute are 
answered if a party dealing with the land has information 
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man upon 
inquiry, and which would, if pursued, lead to actual 
knowledge of the state of the title; and this is actual 
notice. 
There is no question that Severin was put on notice of some 
kind that Woodard was claiming an interest in the property. But 
being put on notice that Woodard was claiming an interest does not 
mean Woodard has superior title, putting an end to the matter. As 
is stated in the Toljmd case, notice is only a trigger to put a 
prudent man on inquiry, "which would, if pursued, lead to actual 
knowledge of the state of the title . . . " 
So, what was the state of the title of which Severin had notice? 
First, Woodard never claimed to have had title to the property 
(R. 190, 193, 194, 315, 328); Jensen never claimed to have conveyed 
title to Woodard (R. 400, 404, 405, 407, 408); and when Severin 
inquired of them he was told Woodard was claiming an interest but 
did not have title. (R. 464-66.) 
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Seco.: . , accuax n u t i c 
whatever Agreement stat*-. 
.: an aareeiriei'1 * 
one-ha l L U , .<•- f .. u.v 
Thirdly ^ i ^ ' 
• f u ^ a 
«'- Sever in proper*-* 
t h a t they :,5; i «= 
_^  v , n e n r i n c <- W o ** - V - . , 
produced a 
revance 
^ t 
. jn .:; 
pt - * [ and 
turned u^ » 
.e represented 
nsurance 
up any 
(Exhibit 8-1), ) 
What mo r e d o e s a p :I : i i 3 e i I 1 ma i I :i o ? 
As stated in Hottinger v._Jensen, 684 P. 2d, 1271 (Utah, 1984): 
11 is a A e11-established principle o£ 1 aw that where 
circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person 
should make inquiries, the law charges the person with 
notice of facts which a reasonable diligent inquiry would 
have disclosed, (At 12,74) 
Severi n meets that standard and is mote than willing, to arcept 
::: f k i I D * 1 e 3i \* m I a c t .".- I l u i . i i i J . m i i t i 11 i 11 i I i i|i in 
inquiry would have disclosed," Those facts were; Woodard did not 
have t i 11e t o t he pr o pe r ty. 
RE^ irERS IBI .E ERROI : Ap| »c 1 I ., 1 11 .J;. t 
that tl le trial court did not issue findings z - ae* md evictions 
of law relative to the mutual mistake ±u Luc xeyai description, 
reformation and actual notice to the Severins. But in factf the 
Trial Court never had to get to those issues because the Court 
determined that the 1972 Agreement was not a land purchase 
agreement. There was no sale—therefore, there was nothing to 
reform, no mutual mistake to correct and certainly no actual notice 
to the Severins of a document that did not exist. 
Appellant is so focused on the fact that he was to get title 
to the property, that he has failed to realize the consequence of 
the Agreement not being a land sale agreement. The Trial Court did 
make a finding of fact that the 1972 Agreement contained an 
erroneous legal description (R.222), but also found that the 1972 
Agreement was "not a conveyance of title to the property." (R.222.) 
Because the Agreement is not a land sale contract, the Court never 
got to the issue of whether or not there had been a mutual mistake 
and whether or not the Agreement should be reformed—because it was 
immaterial. 
CONCLUSION 
As to the quiet title issue between Woodard and Severin, 
Severin has placed before the Court a prima facie title. Woodard 
has not, and cannot, produce a superior title. Rather, Woodard is 
attempting to reform an Agreement to agree to give Woodard a first 
right of refusal or option into a land purchase agreement. 
Reforming the legal description does not transform the Agreement 
-21-
into a land purchase contract. Further, the Agreement contained a 
condition subsequent which never occurred. 
The decision of the Third District Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals should be affirmedf quieting title to the Severins. 
DATED this _J^2_ d a¥ o f Februaryf 1988. 
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APP_E_NDIX__A 
A
__G_R__E_E__M_E_N__T 
W. BRENT JENSEN, Seller and CECIL WOqDARD,__Buy_er 
Se£tember_2_l_L_19J_2 
CAIIIUI 
A G R E E M E N T 
Xhi* agreement a*4e and antarad Into tula 21at day of Septeaber, 1972, 
ay and fcatvaaa V« BRENT JKNSKN, Uaralnaftar rafarrad to aa Seller and 
CECIL WXMaUU), harainaftar rafarrad to aa buyar. Nov, therefore, it la 
keraby agreed between *the partlaa aa follow*: 
1* It la agreed that tae a all a r la deairoua of aalling and the buyar 
la daalrou* *f buying a parcel of ground mora specifically described aa 
« note fV't*'"** **' ***#< ZZQft.S. f**h~> *.^- C«* f-a <*B *W 
«W/»r TS&iCft „*</• ?o<*, *7'ffi "*«* *?,uJ * W < S*/c 
'^iki^iuL Vq& m*t& ^c.i% ua^d »**#&« s 
2. I t la undarataod that Lot No. 1 la in tha procaaa of being node 
r*a4y for recording with Sussoit County, Utah and eanaot ba aold at thla t in*. 
aVove*er, aallar agreea that when Lot No. 1 la recorded the buyar haa f i r s t 
t ight and option to purohaae Lot No. 1. 
3 . Qtttll that Claw buyer agree* go buy per* of Pereet Meadow Ranch 
t l « t * £ Lot #69, aora epec i f ica l ly eeecribed aa beginning at a point 1520 I t . 
M, $12 f t . ft. from W.W. Cor. Sac. 27, TIN, RAK, 8LB4M and running thence: 
s&i*fc'*2f 4*" I . 144.59 f t . | N *3 # 43 ,44w 1 . 1 183.10 f t . ; N. 09* 27' 44M W., 
60.a> f r . i «. 73# 28* 27" K9 94.92 f t ; South 320 f t . , to point of beginning, 
hereinafter referred to aa Lot No. 2. At the t ioe Lot No. 1 la recorded 
the buyer w i l l releaaa the right and intaraat In Lot No. 2, and w i l l exercise 
hie option on Lot No. 1. 
4. TUe aallar ggraaa to provide culllnary water to Lot No. 1 through a 
central water eye tea. 
5. The t e l l e r warrant! to the buyer that a properly loetal led sept ic 
tank ay a tea w i l l meet a l l county and atata requirejianta for aewage diapoaal 
and no accasament w i l l be made for a savage hook-u . 
6. Tones of the ea le . The buyer agraee to pay $7,000.00 in caah and 
8,000 shares of Adak Energy Corporation stock harelnattar rafarrad to aa the 
Stock. The aallar acknowledges the stock la investment stock and at the 
present tine i s not tradable. The aal lar agraea that the a took w i l l ba 
hold in eecrov in the eel lera a ana at the aaia off ice of Walker Bank 4 Truet, 
B00KM56 PA3E389, 
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•to # ono 
Salt Ufc* City, Utah until aaid stock bacoms fraa trading. Tha buyer 
guarantaas to tha aaXlar that tha atock vill hava a aarkat value ot U par 
share oo or bafora Octobar 1» 1974, sad that tha aallar vill ba sbla to 
sail through a broker tha atock for $1 a share. Tha buyer rataina an 
optlam to purchase back tha said stock for $1 par share on or before October 1, 
1974. 
7. tha aallar hereby agraaa to furnish to tha buyar Xitia I n s u r a n c e ^ ^ ^ ' *M 
to tha property no later than Octobar 1, 1974 
W. Brant Jenajtn 
Seller -, \ f, \ /r/^f/^f yfri-rt*** ? ' 
nse
Buyar 
Cecil Woodard 
•a*!**** at g aaint *a*4*r 4*0 f t . an* £•»%, i ta tU twmm tha S.V. 
oaanar 99^0 26, t in, A4£# 8L8e* and running hence H 61 • 30* i$ 670 f t . i 
N U 9 01* l» 330 ft.$ S. 61* 20• U, 665 ft.I S 76° 30' £» 170 f t . I 
8 4a* 40' £, 60 f t . .1 Seuth, 60 ft .I S 16° 30* tt, 130 f t . ta tha point 
•f toaglnnlng. 
H 
C« " 
900KM56 PA0F390 
5.11.* < x V ASZ£*Cf S,1S?'AZ*?<-
N. Br«nt <J«p**n 
Buym. 
toil uoodard 
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Code* Co 
Provo Ut*h 62 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 27 
were bona fide purchasers without notice and 
without further duty to inquire. To hold oth-
erwise would defeat the purpose of the recor-
ding statutes and subvert the sound commer-
cial policy they promote. 
We reverse and remand with instructions to 
quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified, as 
their interests may appear, as against Amer-
ican. Each party shall bear its own costs of 
appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. The reconveyance gives every appearance of being 
the product of a deliberate—and deliberative-
act. The 'Full Reconveyance* was signed by one 
officer and attested by another. It recited that 
written instructions to reconvey had been received 
from the beneficiary and that the note secured by 
the trust deed had been presented for endorsement. 
It additionally recited that the reconveyance was 
executed by authority of a resolution of American's 
board of directors. 
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include nothing 
inconsistent with the conclusion that the dealings of 
Rydalch and Dakal, through the broker Pentelute, 
were at arm's length. 
3. For purposes of this appeal, we employ the 
parties' logic that the legal effect of an improvide-
ntly recorded reconveyance is to leave the lien 
created by the trust deed in legal existence, albeit 
unrecorded. We are not asked to decide whether 
reconveyance has the legal effect of actually termi-
nating the lien created by a trust deed and rendering 
the accompanying note, if it has not been repaid, 
unsecured. 
4. The previously identified specific factors relied on 
by the court in support of its conclusion that Pent-
elute and Peck were not bona fide purchasers do not 
tilt toward that result. Reference in Rydalch's deed 
to American's interest was meaningless in the face 
of American's subsequent reconveyance. A distress 
sale well below market price can be prompted by 
numerous factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stip-
ulation of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed 
to sell so cheaply because he could not secure a loan 
since the duplex was not owner-occupied and 
because of the lis pendens against the property. In 
addition, it was actually stipulated that Rydalch was 
under extreme pressure because of Holzer's threats 
of violence and because of the imminency of a 
trustee's sale noticed by Holzer. A hefty finder's 
fee is to be expected where a free-lance broker 
finds a property which can be had for a comparative 
song. A same-day transfer from one related entity 
to another might be effected for a number of tax or 
business reasons. In this case, Diversified was a 
group of investors put together by Peck but who, 
unlike Peck, apparently had no interest in Dakal. 
The back-to-back sales left the Diversified shar-
eholders with a property worth more than they had 
to pay for it, while netting Dakal, in which Peck 
apparently had a greater interest, $8,000.00 profit. 
5. A duty of inquiry requires the party to make 
inquiry and to diligently do that which the answer to 
the inquiry reasonably prompts. Pentelute's inquiry 
elicited an answer which was consistent with the 
reconveyance document he had seen, the title report, 
and Rydalch's and Burnett's reports about what 
they were told. It would stretch the notion of 
inquiry notice beyond the breaking point to hold 
that the answer Pentelute received to his inquiry of 
American should have prompted him to go further. 
What would he have done? Demand to see receipts, 
instructions for reconveyance from the beneficiary 
to the trustee, or the chairman of American's 
board? He obviously had some concern or, with a 
reconveyance regular on its face in hand, there 
would be no reason to call American for verbal 
confirmation of the fact of reconveyance. But a 
duty to inquire is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressi-
vely investigate, and set straight. See also Note 1, 
supra. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Cecil WOODARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
• . 
W. Brent JENSEN 
Defendant and Third-Party, Plaintiff, 
• . 
Richard Severin and Mrs. Richard Severin, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Before Judges Garff, Bench and Jackson. 
No. 860037-CA 
FILED: Jury 27,1987 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Ernest Baldwin 
ATTORNEYS: 
E. J. Skeen for Appellant. 
Jerrold S. Jensen for Respondents. 
W. Brent Jensen, Pro Se. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Cecil Woodard appeals a trial court judg-
ment quieting title in Richard and Donna 
Severin to a five acre parcel of property. We 
affirm. 
In 1972, Woodard met with a developer, W. 
Brent Jensen, to discuss the purchase by pla-
intiff of five acres of mountain property, 
owned by Jensen, as a cabin site. They agreed 
on a parcel and marked a corner with a pile of 
rocks. On September 21, 1972, Woodard and 
Jensen executed a written agreement, prepared 
by them, which states in pertinent part: 
This agreement made and entered 
into this 21st day of September, 
1972, by and between W. BRENT 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult CodeftCo's Annotation Service 
28 62 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code • C o Provo, Utah 
JENSEN, hereinafter referred to as 
Seller and CECIL WOODARD, 
hereinafter referred to as buyer. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby agreed 
between the parties as follows: 
1. It is agreed that the seller is 
desirous of selling and the buyer is 
desirous of buying a parcel of 
ground more specifically described 
as 
[a metes and bounds legal descr-
iption is written in by hand]. 
The seller also agrees that this 
parcel of land will be a minimum of 
5 acres. 
2. It is understood that Lot No. 1 is 
in the process of being made ready 
for recording with Summit County, 
Utah and cannot be sold at this 
time. However, seller agrees that 
when Lot No. 1 is recorded the 
buyer has first right and option to 
purchase Lot No. 1. 
3. Until that time buyer agrees to 
buy part of Forest Meadow Ranch 
Plat C Lot #69, more specifically 
described as 
[legal description typed in] 
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. 
At the time Lot No. 1 is recorded 
the buyer will release the right and 
interest in Lot No. 2, and will exe-
rcise his option on Lot No. 1. 
7. The Seller hereby agrees to 
furnish to buyer Title Insurance to 
the property no later than October 
1, 1974. 
The handwritten legal description in paragraph 
one was entered by Jensen a day or two after 
execution of the agreement. Approximately 
one week later, Jensen typed in a legal descr-
iption of the property at the end of the second 
page of the agreement and the two men again 
executed the agreement. Both descriptions 
erroneously described a five acre parcel south 
of the property Woodard selected which 
Jensen did not even own. 
Woodard paid Jensen $7,000.00 cash and 
delivered 6,000 shares of stock to him as a 
down payment on the property. Woodard also 
delivered to Jensen title to a truck as partial 
payment and in exchange for Jensen's agree-
ment to dig the footings and basement for the 
cabin. In August, 1973, despite having no title 
yet in the property, Woodard began constru-
ction of his cabin on the five acre parcel of 
property he had selected. 
Meanwhile, and also in August, 1973, 
Jensen conveyed a 17.59 acre parcel, just 
south of Woodard's cabin, to Richard and 
Donna Severin. The Severins also began con-
struction of a cabin that month. The parties 
met occasionally and discussed their cabins. At 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
| one time, Ricnard Severin asked Woodard 
I why he was building on land he did not own. 
Woodard told Severin he had an agreement 
with Jensen to purchase the property. Jensen 
conveyed additional property to the Severins 
on November 22,1974. 
On December 10, 1974, Woodard filed a 
complaint against Jensen seeking specific 
performance of the agreement and execution 
of a warranty deed to the property described 
in paragraph one and at the bottom of page 
two. In his answer filed January 7, 1975, 
Jensen admitted he sold to Woodard the 
property in paragraph three and further gave 
him a first right and option to purchase other 
property when recorded. Woodard filed an 
amended complaint adding an alternative 
remedy of money damages in light of Jensen's 
possible inability to fulfill the condition of 
recording under the agreement. 
On July 30, 1976, Jensen, through Security 
Title Company, conveyed 56 acres to the 
Severins by special warranty deed. This 
acreage encompasses the prior two conveya-
nces from Jensen to the Severins plus most of 
the Vive acres claimed by Woodard. On Dec-
ember 27, 1977, Jensen again through Security 
Title Company conveyed ten more acres to the 
Severins which encompasses the remainder of 
the property claimed by Woodard. 
At a pre-trial conference between 
Woodard and Jensen, the parties realized the 
mutual mistake committed in the description 
of the property. The trial court authorized 
Jensen to file a third-party complaint against 
the Severins to rescind the five acre portion of 
the deed claimed by Woodard. Jensen filed his 
third-party complaint on July 6, 1979 which 
was later dismissed by the court. 
Woodard filed a second amended complaint 
on April 11, 1980, increasing the requested 
damages. Then, on October 17, 1980, he filed 
a third amended complaint alleging for the 
first time mutual mistake in the original agr-
eement. Woodard offered a substitute legal 
description of the property and requested 
reformation and specific performance of the 
agreement and an order requiring the Severins 
to execute and deliver a quitclaim deed to the 
disputed five acres. In the alternative, 
Woodard requested $63,500.00 in damages. 
Trial was held July 8 and 9, 1982. The court 
found the 1972 agreement was not a convey-
ance of title to the property and that the 
Severins were, through a series of recorded 
conveyances, the record title owners of the 
disputed property. Woodard was held to have 
no right, title, or interest in said property and 
was, therefore, estopped to claim specific 
performance of the agreement or a deed to the 
property. As between Woodard and Jensen, 
the court ordered Jensen to pay him 
$25,300.00 in damages, the value of the pro-
perty with improvements ($28,500.00) less the 
balance due on the agreed price ($3,200.00). 
consult Code«Co's Annotation Service 
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On appeal, Woodard argues the trial court 
erred in ignoring in its findings, conclusions, 
and judgment the following determinative 
issues: reformation of the agreement, admitted 
mutual mistake, specific performance of the 
reformed agreement, possession of the land by 
Woodard, and actual notice of the Severins. 
He asks this Court to reverse the judgment 
and remand with instructions to reform and 
specifically enforce the agreement against the 
Severins. 
The equitable remedies of reformation and 
specific performance are not available in the 
instant case. As Woodard and Jensen discu-
ssed the purchase and sale of the property, 
Jensen informed him the contract he had with 
the original sellers prohibited conveyances of 
less than ten acres unless the property was in a 
recorded subdivision. The parties incorporated 
this condition into the agreement: 
2. It is understood that Lot No. I is 
in the process of being made ready 
for recording with Summit County, 
Utah and cannot be sold at this 
time. However, seller agrees that when 
Lot No. 1 is recorded the 
buyer has first right and option to 
purchase Lot No. 1. 
3. Until that time buyer agrees to 
buy part of Forest Meadow Ranch 
Plat C Lot #69, more specifically 
described as 
[legal description typed in] 
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. 
At the time Lot No. 1 is recorded 
the buyer will release the right and 
interest in Lot No. 2, and will exe-
rcise his option on Lot No. 1. 
(Emphasis added.) 
However, subsequent to execution of the 
agreement, Jensen discovered Summit County 
had changed its requirements for recording 
recreational property. The new requirements, 
as Jensen understood them, made it impossible 
for him to subdivide and record Woodard's 
desired property. 
Both before and after October 1, 1974, the 
date by which Jensen was to furnish title ins-
urance to Woodard, Jensen told Woodard that 
because he was unable to record the subdivi-
sion, he could not convey the property. He 
suggested various alternatives, all of which 
Woodard rejected. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled where a 
certain event or situation is essentially made a 
condition to an agreement, the absence of 
such event or situation precludes specific per-
formance of the agreement. BLT Inv. Co. v. 
Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978). In the 
instant case, recording was clearly a condition 
precedent to Jensen's duty to offer a first 
right and option to purchase the property 
under the agreement. As the condition prece-
dent of the agreement has not been fulfilled, 
the equitable remedies of reformation and 
specific performance of the agreement are not 
available to Woodard. 
We therefore affirm the judgment. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Ben K. HOOPIIAINA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, dba, 
LDS Hospital, and Jane Doe, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Garff and Billings. 
No. 860076-CA 
FILED: July 27, 1987 
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Hon. Dean E. Conder 
ATTORNEYS: 
Matt Biljanic for Appellant. 
Charles W. Dahlquist for Respondents. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing 
his medical malpractice action against Inter-
mountain Health Care, dba L.D.S. Hospital 
and granting defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. We affirm. 
In January, 1981, plaintiff, while a patient 
at L.D.S. Hospital, was given a 200 mg. tablet 
of quinidine, a drug which had been ordered 
for another patient located in the same room 
as plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that the drug 
caused injuries to his lungs and cardiovascular 
system. On February 9, 1984, defendant filed 
a motion for summary judgment based on 
plaintiffs failure to establish, through expert 
testimony, that the quinidine caused his inju-
ries. Plaintiff admitted he did not have an 
expert but asserted that he was attempting to 
obtain one and would have one before trial. 
Based on that representation, the court denied 
the motion without prejudice. Defendant filed 
a certificate of readiness for trial on March 5, 
1984, and the trial was set for September 17, 
1984. Plaintiff did not object to the certifica-
tion or the trial date. Defendant renewed his 
motion for summary judgment in July, 1984, 
For comoiete Utah Cnd* A 
